5 Lessons from 1995

What the Quebec referendum tells us about Alberta secession

As Alberta edges toward a potential sovereignty referendum in 2026, the 1995 Quebec referendum remains the most relevant precedent to guide our thinking.

Robert Young’s The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada (1999) offers a deeply researched analytical framework: one that Albertans—federalists and separatists alike—would be wise to revisit.

Of course, Alberta 2025 is not Quebec of 30 years ago. The differences in law, geography, political culture, economic structure, and international context are as crucial as the lessons that transcend time and space.

Given this, here are 5 hard lessons we should take away from the last time Canada confronted the breakup of the country.

1) A ‘Yes’ vote is not a shortcut to autonomy

Separatists are fond of suggesting that Alberta would throw off the yoke of federalism the day after a Yes vote. That freedom would be instantaneous and economic prosperity immediate.

In reality, a Yes vote would kickstart an arduous process of negotiation — one in which Alberta would need to make considerable concessions in order to maintain the strong connections with Canada necessary to secure a stable future.

It is not inconceivable that Alberta ends up with a worse deal than Confederation, as its biggest demands (e.g., access to tidewater) may only be met by relinquishing current advantages (e.g., its share of the national debt).

Even Quebec sovereigntists envisioned a continued economic and political partnership with the rest of Canada (ROC). Leading Alberta separatists envision a similar relationship involving a common market, passport, currency, or even pension plan.

In these and other areas, Alberta would end up ceding authority to Canada; they would be a policy-taker to a greater extent than if they had remained within Confederation, where at least they would have (the proapect of) representation in federal decision-making.

Young makes clear that meaningful economic integration requires parallel integration in monetary, fiscal, and even political terms. This diminishes the gains in policy sovereignty that independence promises.

This places separatists in a Catch-22 scenario: in order to provide the kind of economic stability or prosperity they propose, they will need to recreate many of the linkages found in the very economic union they're threatening to destroy.

For Alberta, whose separatists often tout economic freedom and market autonomy as the whole point of leaving Canada, the paradox is stark: the more Alberta seeks to integrate with ROC (or the U.S.) post-separation, the less autonomy it will actually enjoy. Which puts the whole project in question.

Young’s most enduring insight is that a Yes vote is not the end of the story. It is the beginning of an arduous negotiation where the smaller, seceding party (Alberta) has fewer allies and cards to play than it would if it pushed for autonomy from within Confederation.

Most experts agree with the Supreme Court that secession would require amending the Constitution of Canada.

A unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) could be an endrun around this process. But a UDI is dangerous, given it would throw Alberta into a state of legal chaos with no constitution or applicable laws.

(Sidenote: A UDI is also likely infeasible. It would require Alberta to establish that it has a monopoly on coercion within its territory and that Albetans are an oppressed (e.g., colonized) people — dual claims that international law does not support.)

Ironically then, seeking secession would force Alberta to engage in the very constitutional amending process they claim is stacked against their interests. Only this time, unlike patriation or the Charlottetown Accord, they would be all alone in advancing their proposed reforms. No other provinces would be likely allies with a seceding government.

Worse yet, the federal government must agree to any constitutional amendment to remove a province from Confederation, and all provinces — including Alberta — must unanimously approve it.

This level of consensus is difficult at the best of times. During crisis, and following a divisive campaign during which separatists would have to disparage these same partners, it seems all the more improbable — especially on terms favorable to the party that had initiated the process.

The negotiations will be fraught with ambiguity, legal challenges (especially by Indigenous nations), and an emotional tug-of-war. Simply put, Alberta would be negotiating from a position of weakness, not strength. And there is zero chance they will end up with everything separatists promise at the outset of a referendum campaign. There are no guarantees for either side. And likely no gains, at least in the near term.

2) Economic risks are real and immediate

Not unlike Quebec in 1995, Alberta is highly dependent on foreign direct investment and vulnerable to global economic pressures. In an age of declining oil and rising global instability, transition costs of secession would be high, immediate, and long-lasting.

Credit downgrades, capital flight, and investor uncertainty could increase debt-servicing costs by billions per year. This calamity would occur exactly when Alberta would need every dollar to establish new institutions to replace federal ones (military, postal service, revenue agency, and so on).

All of this points to government intervention, high taxes, unprecedented borrowing, and debt accumulation — things that are antithetical to the free-enterprise utopia promised by Alberta separatists.

While Quebec made the case that cultural pride was worth these sorts of short-term losses, Alberta separatists have hinged their whole project on economic gains. Their case to the public is all the more challenging, especially when the business community weighs in on the negatives.

Overall, Alberta separatists will be under the same dual pressures their Quebec counterparts faced: 1) they will need to preach economic stability and growth, but that will also require 2) maintaining close economic, fiscal, and political relations with Canada. As with point #1, this will leave many Albertans asking ‘what's the point of all the upheaval if we end up with the same arrangements, anyhow?’

3) The path to secession leads through Ottawa

Post-1995, the federal Clarity Act gives the federal Parliament the power to determine whether a referendum question and margin of victory are sufficiently “clear” to force Ottawa and ROC to negotiate with a secessionist province.

This means the Alberta government is required to submit the referendum question to Ottawa for approval before they hold the vote. (Given the Smith government's reluctance to pick a side in the secession referendum, they might well prefer to offload this responsibility anyhow.)

The Clarity Act provisions are both a safeguard and a burden for the federal government, however.

If the question is too vague or skewed away from pure “separation” toward “sovereignty” (as “sovereignty-association” was in Quebec), Ottawa may reject or amend it.

Strategically, the federal government and ROC have every incentive to keep the question a straight-up ‘leave or stay’ vote; doing so gives them the advantage of strategic ambiguity about the post-Yes arrangements, which separatists would paint as rosy.

This is the sticky wicket the federalists will confront. On one hand, they will be tempted to portray a Yes vote in as starkly negative terms as possible, dissuading soft separatists from choosing to leave on the premise that Canada will remain a close economic partner and political ally. This approach could backfire, however, as it would offer further evidence of Canada's unwillingness to support the aspirations of their province.

On the other hand, while remaining ambiguous and playing up the uncertainties of a Yes vote may appear conciliatory and leave them a freer hand to negotiate, federalists would cede important ground to separatists who are painting a clearer and roster portrait of the future.

By engaging at all in hypotheticals let alone tabling the referendum question in Parliament, the federal government risks being bound by the result. Once they buy-into the premise of the exercise and validate the question, they would need to respect the answer.

Any Alberta referendum will therefore not just be about public sentiment, but also about procedural legitimacy.

4) Indigenous Peoples Cannot Be Ignored

Indigenous people now living in Alberta have strong, domestically and internationally recognized claims to self-determination and treaty rights. If Alberta is divisible from Canada, then so are these nations from Alberta. Indigenous leaders would likely challenge the referendum's legality in court and internationally.

This is easily the biggest obstacle to Alberta secession: Alberta sits on treaty lands, and changing the treaty relationships between the signatories (Crown and nations) would require approval of all partners involved. Even if the Government of Canada were to attempt to assign its benefits, duties and obligations to a seceding state, First Nations partners would still need to agree to the change in terms. No one has indicated a remote interest in doing so.

On this basis, courts could stall the referendum before it’s even held.

5) Negotiations will be polarizing and prolonged

Provided a vote proceeded, Young estimates 6 to 12 months for post-Yes negotiations. Anything longer would result in economic ruin for everyone involved, providing incentives to work quickly.

But Alberta’s case may take longer given the legal uncertainty, the rise of populism, and the lack of clear leadership, consensus and political experience in the province's separatist movement so far. (This could change.)

Negotiators will face the temptation to view every act of self-interest from the other side as malice. This polarization risks escalating into tit-for-tat institutional paralysis or worse.

A successful outcome — short of a complete breakdown — requires a conciliatory tone that is sorely lacking in Alberta’s current political discourse and leadership.

What's next?

Young's book helps us understand the paths that may lie ahead for Alberta, Ottawa, and ROC. He doesn't provide a clear roadmap for Alberta secession; as he notes throughout the volume, the routes into and out of referendums are uncertain until you clear them yourself.

In the months ahead, our Common Ground team will be in the field with surveys, focus groups, social media monitoring, and interviews to better understand the separatist movement. We will be engaging with experts to further chart the potential legal, economic, political, and democratic routes to secession. Stay tuned to our Substack for updates on our findings (https://cground.substack.com/).

All of this is an attempt to shed light on the uncut paths that lie ahead. Critics will label this work an exercise in sane-washing or platforming. To them I say: separatists don't need amplification; the premier, journalists, and social media have given them all the platform they need.

Our role as academics is to help society make sense of the options and implications of the monumental choices they'll be asked to make. And if Young's book is a cautionary tale, we should be prepared for an onslaught of important questions.